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1 Introduction
The literature on eciency wage predicts a direct and increasing relationship between
the wage paid by rms and the level of eort provided by workers (Akerlof and Yellen,
1986, Katz, 1986). In equilibrium, rms may nd it protable to pay wage in excess
of market clearing. Eciency wage theories produce several interesting implications.
In particular, they explain that permanent involuntary unemployment may exist under
conditions of equilibrium in labor markets. Eciency wage models are also capable of
generating a number of other stylized labor markets facts, including real wage rigidity, dual
labor markets, wage distributions for workers with identical productive characteristics and
discrimination among observationally distinct groups.
Because of the impact of the wage setting on the workers' eort, prot-maximizing
rms are expected to set an optimal wage such that the elasticity of eort with respect
to wage is equal to one. This well-known result of the standard eciency wage model is
due to Solow (1979) and is known as the Solow condition. The eciency wage minimizes
the employer's wage cost per eective units of service employed and each rm hires labor
up to the point where the marginal product is equal to the eciency wage. However,
it has been suggested that the Solow condition does not hold in general. In particular,
Akerlof and Yellen (1986, question 4, pp. 1416) point out that an eort-wage elasticity
of unity is undoubtedly excessive. This is an important issue, since it casts doubt on the
possibility of an equilibrium with unemployment in an eciency wage model.
Numerous suggestions have been proposed in the literature to illustrate an eort-wage
elasticity lower than one. Akerlof and Yellen (1986) present a static model with external
costs to account for the downside risk from shirking labor. In Schmidt-Sørensen (1990),
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xed employment costs per worker are introduced in the prot function. Pisauro (1991)
sets out a model with specic taxes on labor. Lin and Lai (1994) show that the Solow
condition does not hold in an intertemporal maximizing framework with turnover costs.
Marti (1997) and Faria (2000) examine models that combine the shirking and the turnover
models of eciency wage, with the possibility of managerial supervision. The role of the
quality of job matching on eciency wages is analyzed by Jellal and Zenou (1999). When
job matching is unobservable, rms can either set wages such that the eort-wage elasticity
is lower or greater than one. Finally, Jellal and Zenou (2000) consider a dynamic eciency
wage model with learning by doing, where workers accumulate a stock of knowledge which
allows them to increase their eort.
Rather than relying on microeconomic foundations for the eciency wage model, such
as shirking or labor turnover costs, we follow a dierent path in this paper to show that
the Solow condition does not hold in general. For our purpose, we analyze the optimal
wage policy in a dual labor markets model with eciency wage. Following Doeringer and
Piore (1971), we consider two types of sector dierentiated according to the type of jobs
(see also Acemoglu, 2001). In the primary sector, jobs are stable and well paid, contrary
to the secondary sector. Primary jobs are more complex than secondary jobs, so that it
is more dicult to monitor worker performance. This is the explanation of dual labor
markets given by Bulow and Summers (1986), based on the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1987)
labor shirking eciency wage model. Dierent wage levels are due to dierent monitoring
costs across industries, thus providing a supply side explanation of dual labor markets
1
.
We assume that wage dierences between sectors stem from the presence of eciency
1
Additional references concerning dual labor markets in the eld of eciency wages include Agénor
and Santaella (1998), Albrecht and Vroman (1992), Jones (1987) and Saint-Paul (1996, chapter 5) for an
empirical survey.
3
wage in the primary sector. Thus, in the context of dual labor markets, we prove that
eort-wage elasticity is expected to be lower than unity in a Stackelberg equilibrium. The
primary sector acts as a leader in setting the wage policy and the secondary sector as
a follower, thus leading to a strategic eciency wage. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. In section 2, we present a dual labor markets model with eciency
wage. In section 3, we determine the strategic eciency wage and examine the relevance
of the Solow condition. Concluding comments are in section 4.
2 A dual labor markets model
We consider an economy in which there are two sectors. Dual labor markets can arise when
monitoring diculties vary across rms. The wage-productivity nexus is thus important
only in one sector of the economy, the primary sector. We assume that there exists one
representative rm per sector.
That each rm acts as a monopsonist within its sector may seem unrealistic. An
interpretation is to consider that there are in fact several rms per sector, but these rms
collude to act as a monopsonist (see Wauthy and Zenou, 2000, 2001). Another argument,
which is more relevant in our context, is to rely on local labor markets (see Topel, 1986).
For instance, let us assume the presence of a two-sectors labor market, with a high-
technology sector and a low-technology sector. Workers decide to work by comparing net
wages across sectors. In each sector, the same level of qualication is required by rms.
So, workers are characterized by low mobility within each sector and even if rms are
numerous, a monopsony market power prevails in each sector. Clearly, monopsony power
is bounded by mobility costs (due to changes of industry, of city, of qualication), so that
monopsonistic rms are credible as one considers suciently important mobility costs (see
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the discussion in Thisse and Zenou, 1997)
2
.
The output of the primary rm is a function of the workers' level of eort, which is
variable due to imperfect monitoring. The eciency wage hypothesis is relevant in the
primary sector and there are job rationing and voluntary payments by rms of wages in
excess of market-clearing. Thus, the output in the primary sector is a function of labor
eciency units, i.e. the product of eort and employment. The prot function of the
primary rm is :
 = F

e

w
w
0

N

  wN (1)
where e(:) is the aggregated eort function for the primary workers, w is the level of wage
in the primary rm, w
0
is the level of wage in the secondary rm, N is the number of
workers in the primary rm, and F (:) is the production function of the primary rm. We
make the standard assumption of concavity (F
0
> 0, F
00
< 0).
Conversely, for the secondary rm, the wage-productivity relationship is supposed to
be nonexistent. Therefore, a fully neoclassical behavior is expected for that rm. Owing
to perfect monitoring, the output in the secondary sector is supposed to depend on a
constant level of eort. In the model, there is no unemployment. As claimed by Akerlof
and Yellen (1986, p. 3), the market for secondary jobs clears, and anyone can obtain a
job in this sector, although it might be at a lower pay. Let G(L N) be the production
function of the secondary rm, where L is the total labor force in the economy. Thus,
the wage in the competitive secondary sector is given by the marginal productivity in this
sector, which is given by G
0
(L N). Again, we suppose that G
0
> 0 and G
00
< 0.
We make the following assumption concerning how dual local labor markets operate.
We focus on a Stackelberg equilibrium which leads to a strategic eciency wage. The
2
For empirical evidence on monopsony power in the labor market, see Boal and Ramson (1997).
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representative primary rm acts as a leader when setting its optimal employment-wage
decisions, while the secondary rm acts as a follower. Hence, the rm operating in the
primary sector faces the following maximization program :
max
w;N
 = F
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N

  wN s.t. w
0
= G
0
(L N) (2)
which can also be expressed as :
max
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The corresponding rst-order conditions are :
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According to (4), the marginal benet of adjusting wages is equalized with its marginal
cost, which is the optimal condition for wage setting. According to (5), the rm hires
labor up to the point where the marginal cost of labor is equal to its marginal revenue.
3 Strategic eciency wage and the Solow condition
Given the competitive behavior for the secondary rm, we can now determine the optimal
value for the eciency wage. Since the condition G
0
(L N) = w
0
holds, equation (5) can
also be expressed as :
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Using (4), the marginal productivity of the primary rm is such that :
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Let (
w
w
0
) =
e
0
e
w
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0
be the eort-wage elasticity ;  =  
G
00
(L N)
G
0
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(L  N) is the elasticity of
the marginal productivity (wage) in the secondary sector ;
N
L N
indicates the relative size
of the primary rm in comparison with the secondary rm. Hence, we obtain the optimal
strategic eciency wage given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The eort-wage elasticity in a dual labor markets model is :


w
w
0

=
L N
L N + N
(8)
Proof : Using (6) and (7), and by rearranging some terms, we arrive at the following
expression for the eort-wage elasticity :
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From the denitions of  and , we deduce that (
w
w
0
) = (L N)=(L N + N). QED
Corollary 1 The eort-wage elasticity in a Stackelberg equilibrium is less than one.
Thus, in this framework, we provide formal proof that the Solow condition does not
hold with dual labor markets. Indeed, the production function is characterized by decreas-
ing returns to scale, so that we have  =  
G
00
(L N)
G
0
(L N)
(L N) > 0. Hence, L N+N > L N
and clearly (
w
w
0
) < 1. Therefore, our result can be treated as theoretical support for the
argument developed in Akerlof and Yellen (1986), who argue that an eort-wage elastic-
ity of unity is quite high. Given the production technologies, the eort-wage elasticity is
less than one when one accounts for strategic interactions between the primary and the
secondary sectors
3
.
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With a production function of the sort F (e;N), there is not necessarily a lower equilibrium eort-
wage elasticity. This result is standard in the eciency wage literature (see Ramaswamy and Rowthorn,
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Proposition 1 has the following interpretation. We restrict our attention to the case
of two levels of technology, high and low. An eciency wage is implemented for the
high-technology rm because of imperfect monitoring. Hence, high wages are paid in
exchange of high amounts of eort. Workers participate only in one of the two rms (no
unemployment). By playing a Stackelberg equilibrium, the primary rm can threaten the
workers not to nd a job in the high-technology sector, thereby leading to a lower wage
for them in the rm with low-technology. The lesson of our paper is that in such a setting,
the eort-wage elasticity is lower than one. There is an incentive for a manager to increase
the wage level in the primary rm. For a high value of w, the level of employment in this
sector is low and there is a shift of labor from the primary to the secondary sector, which
decreases the value of w
0
(since L N is higher).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a dual labor markets model with eciency wage. Con-
sidering a Stackelberg equilibrium in which the primary sector acts as a leader and the
secondary sector as a follower, we show that the Solow condition does not hold in general
and an eort-wage elasticity lower than one is expected. This theoretical result puts in
perspective the intuition presented in Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and indicates that it is
important to account for the strategic aspects between sectors in the labor market when
1991). In the dual labor market case, the strategic eciency wage is :


w
w
0

=

N

e
1
1 + 
N
L N
where F
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= @F=@N are elasticities of production with respect to eort and employment
in the primary sector. Thus, 
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examining eciency wage, both from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint.
In addition, the dual labor markets model with eciency wage provides a new ex-
planation concerning the presence of a minimum wage in the labor market. While the
low-technology rm is characterized by a wage which depends on its marginal productiv-
ity, the minimum wage is not aected by the structure of employment. Thus, by setting
a minimum wage, the public authority prevents the rm characterized by leadership to
inuence the wage level in the low-technology rm. It follows that the Solow condition is
restored in the case of dual labor markets when a minimum wage exists.
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